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NOTES AND COMMENTS 

TAX LAW-I.R. C. § 2032A SPECIAL USE VALUATION: Estate of 
Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1989) 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1976, Congress enacted a proVision as part ofthe Tax Reform 
Act1 which was designed to assist the agricultural sector of the na­
tional economy and reduce the exodus of farmers from farming. 2 This 
provision incorporated section 2032A, "special use valuation," into 
the Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C."). Section 2032A allows "quali­
fied" farms and small businesses to save federal estate taxes by valuing 
the farm or business at its current use, rather than the "highest and 
best" use. 3 
The legislative history of section 2032A indicates that the preser­
vation of family farms and businesses was a primary concern of the 
drafters.4 However, as seen in the recent case ofEstate of Thompson v. 
Commissioner,s differing interpretations of the statute and its legisla­
tive history have led to confusing and contradictory applications. In 
particular, courts have struggled to resolve conflicts arising in situa­
tions where some component of the family farm belongs to non-family 
members. In those situations, the question arises whether the exist­
ence of this non-family component disqualifies an otherwise qualified, 
1. Tax Reform Act of 1976, PUb. L. No. 94-455, § 2003, 90 Stat. 1520, 1856-62 
(codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2032A (1988». 
2. See Note, Taxation: Valuation ofFarmland for Estate Tax Purposes, Qualifying 
for LR.C § 2032A Special Use Valuation, 23 WASHBURN L. REv. 638,640-41 (1984). 
3. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the value of property in the 
decedent's gross estate was the fair market value of the property on the day of the dece­
dent's death. The fair market value of real property is the price at which the property 
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. One 
of the most important factors in determining fair market value is the highest and best use to 
which the property may be assigned. H.R. REp. No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3356, 3375; see Whalen V. United 
States, 826 F.2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1987); Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 
1168, 1170 (7th Cir. 1984). 
4. See infra text accompanying note 27. 
5. 864 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1989). 
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196 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW (Vol. 12:195 
predominantly family-owned farm from the benefits of special use val­
uation. Courts have attempted to protect the predominantly family­
owned farm without expanding the application of special use valuation 
beyond its intended scope. 
In determining eligibility for special use valuation, courts must 
initially determine if the family farm was "acquired from or passed 
from the decedent to a qualified heir of the decedent."6 This Note will 
discuss and evaluate the dilemma faced by the judiciary in applying 
conflicting interpretations of "qualified heir" under section 2032A. 
Section I discusses the legislative history of the statute, the specific· 
eligibility requirements, and the judicial interpretations of special use 
valuation. Section II presents the Estate of Thompson 7 case, in which 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed 
special use valuation to be applied proportionally to that portion of the 
family farm that passed into the hands of a qualified heir. This is in 
contrast to the alternative approach, based on a strict reading of the 
statute, that would allow special use valuation only if the entire estate 
passed to qualified heirs. 8 Section III examines the contrasting views 
regarding the relative importance of the legislative intent versus the 
statutory language in the interpretation of section 2032A. In addition, 
section III balances the concerns expressed by the majority and dis­
senting opinions. Ultimately, section III makes a recommendation for 
a legislative amendment to section 2032A which will allow an estate to 
pass a statutorily defined "minor interest" to a non-qualified heir yet 
remain eligible for special use valuation. 
I. SPECIAL USE VALUATION-SECTION 2032A 
A. The Structure ofSection 2032A 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976, which created the original section 
2032A,9 introduced a change in the valuation area of federal estate 
taxation. The change was embodied in section 2003 of the Act, which 
was incorporated in the Internal Revenue Code as section 2032A. 
Section 2032A involves the valuation for estate tax purposes of certain 
real property devoted to farming or closely held businesses.1O In order 
for an estate to qualify for section 2032A special use valuation, the 
6. I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988). 
7. 864 F.2d 1128. 
8. See Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1168, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1984). 
9. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2003, 90 Stat. 1520, 1856-62. 
10. [d. 
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following requirements must be met: II 
1. The decedent must have been a United States citizen or resi­
dent at the time of his death; 12 
2. The executor had to elect the application of section 2032A 13 
and file a written agreement signed by every individual who had an 
interest in the propertyl4 consenting to the application of the recapture 
provisions; IS 
3. The real property must be located in the United States; 16 
4. On the date of the decedent's death, the property must have 
been used by the decedent or a member of the decedent's familyl7 for a 
qualified use;18 
5. Fifty percent or more ofthe adjusted value ofthe gross estatel9 
must consist of the adjusted value of real or personal property which, 
at the time of decedent's death, was used for a qualified use and was 
acquired from the decedent or passed from the decedent to a qualified 
heir-,20 
6. Twenty-five percent or more of the adjusted value of the gross 
estate must consist of the adjusted value of real property being used 
for a qualified use on the date of the decedent's death;21 
7. During an eight-year period prior to the decedent's death, an 
aggregate period of five years or more must exist during which time (a) 
the property was owned by the decedent or a member of the dece-
II. I.R.C. § 2032A (1988). 
12. Id. § 2032A(a)(I)(A). The maximum reduction in the value of the decedent's 
gross estate through an election under section 2032A is not allowed to exceed $500,000. Id. 
§ 2032A(a)(2). 
13. Id. § 2032A(a)(I)(B), (dXI). 
14. Id. § 2032A(a)(I)(B), (d)(2). 
15. Id. § 2032A(d)(2). For a discussion of the "recapture period," see infra note 33. 
16. Id. § 2032A(b)(I). 
17. A member of the family was defined as an individual's ancestor or lineal descen­
dant, a lineal descendant of a grandparent of such individual, the spouse of the individual, 
or the spouse of any such descendant. Id. § 2032A(e)(2). 
18. Id. § 2032A(b)(I)(A)(i). "Qualified Use" for purposes of section 2032A means 
"the devotion of the property to any of the following: (A) use as a farm for farming pur­
poses, or (B) use in a trade or business other than the trade or business of farming." Id. 
§ 2032A(b)(2). 
19. "Adjusted Value" of the gross estate is the value of the gross estate, determined 
without regard to section 2032A, reduced by any amounts allowable as a deduction. Id. 
§ 2032A(b)(3). 
20. Id. § 2032A(b)(I)(A). A qualified heir was defined as a member of the dece­
dent's family who acquired property from the decedent. If a qualified heir disposed of any 
interest in qualified real property to any member of his/her fanlily, that individual is 
treated as a qualified heir. Id. § 2032A(e)(I). 
21. Id. § 2032A(b)(I)(B). 
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dent's family and was used for a qualified use, and (b) the decedent or 
a member of the decedent's family materially participated in the oper­
ation of the farm or other business.22 
Section 2032A on its face, therefore, requires that certain requirements 
must be met prior to eligibility for special use valuation. While the 
statute specifies that the property must pass to a qualified heir,23 it 
does not describe the outcome in a situation where some portion of the 
farm or other qualified property passes to a non-qualified heir. As a 
result, it is helpful to examine the subsequent amendments to section 
2032A and its legislative history in order to determine how the courts 
have resolved this dilemma. 
Section 2032A permits real property used for farming pUrposes24 
or a closely held business to be valued for estate tax purposes on the 
basis of its current use as a farm or business, rather than on the basis 
of its fair market value.2s The legislative history reinforced that Con­
gress, through special use valuation, attempted to alleviate the prob­
lem of farmers who were forced to sell their farms in order to pay 
federal estate taxes.26 The Report of the House Ways and Means· 
Committee detailed the reasons for the change: 
[W]hen land is actually used for farming purposes or in other 
closely held businesses (both before and after the decedent's death), 
it is inappropriate to value the land on the basis of its potential 
"highest and best use" especially since it is desirable to encourage 
22. Id. § 2032A(b)(I)(C). 
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
24. The terms "farming purposes" and "farm" are defined in section 2003(a) of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, which was incorporated into I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(4)-(5). "The 
term 'farm' includes stock, dairy, poultry, fruit, furbearing animal, and truck farms, planta­
tions, ranches, nurseries, ranges, greenhouses or other similar structures used primarily for 
the raising of agricultural or horticultural commodities, and orchards and woodlands." 
I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(4) (1988). "Farming purposes" means: 
(A) cultivating the soil or raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticul­
tural commodity (including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training, 
and management of animals) on a farm; 
(B) handling, drying, packing, grading, or storing on a farm any agricultural 
or horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state, but only if the owner, 
tenant, or operator of the farm regularly produces more than one-half of the com­
modity so treated; and 
(C) (i) the planting, cultivating, caring for, or cutting of trees, or 
(ii) the preparation (other than milling) of trees for market. 
Id. § 2032A(e)(5). 
25. H.R. REP. No. 1380, supra note 3, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3356, 3359. 
26. Id. at 21-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3356, 3375­
76. 
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the continued use of property for farming and other small business 
purposes. Valuation on the basis of highest and best use, rather 
than actual use, may result in the imposition of substantially higher 
estate taxes. In some cases, the greater estate tax burden makes 
continuation of farming, or the closely held business activities, not 
feasible because the income potential from these activities is insuffi­
cient to service extended tax payments or loans obtained to pay the 
tax. Thus, the heirs may be forced to sell the land for development 
purposes. Also, where the valuation of land reflects speculation to 
such a degree that the price of the land does not bear a reasonable 
relationship to its earning capacity, your committee believes it un­
reasonable to require that this "speculative value" be included in an 
estate with respect to land devoted to farming or closely held 
businesses.27 
Since its original enactment in 1976, section 2032A has been 
amended a number of times. An understanding of the primary 
amendments to section 2032A is necessary in order to determine the 
legislative purpose, which in tum, is key to an understanding of the 
case law. 
B. Statutory Amendments to Section 2032A 
1. The Revenue Act of 1978 
The first amendment to directly affect special use valuation was 
contained within the Revenue Act of 1978.28 While the majority of 
the changes to section 2032A were technical corrections and c1arifica­
tions,29 section 2032A(b)(I) was amended to apply the special election 
provision only to interests passing to qualified heirs. 30 
2. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 
The second set of amendments to section 2032A were made as 
27. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3356, 3375-76. 
28. See Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763. 
29. The Revenue Act of 1978 made further additions to section 2032A, through the 
adoption of sections 2032A(e)(9), 2032A(e)(10), and 2032A(c)(6). Section 2032A(e)(9) was 
added to clarify the criteria whereby property is considered to have been obtained from a 
decedent. Section 2032A(e)(1O) was added for cases involving community property. Sec­
tion 2032A(c)(5) was added to allow the substitution of a bond instead of personal liability 
of a qualified heir, in the event of recapture. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 
§§ 701-703, 92 Stat. 2763, 2897-932, 2939-44. For a discussion of the "recapture period," 
see infra note 33. 
30. Prior to the Revenue Act of 1978, it was unclear whether the remaining interest 
in a farm or business should also be valued under special use valuation if it did not pass to a 
"qualified heir." 65 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) § 515 (Nov. 2, 1978). 
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part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 ("ERTA").31 Both 
technical and substantive changes were made to section 2032A as a 
result of ERTA. Following ERTA, the qualified use requirement 
under section 2032A(b)(I) could be satisfied if either the decedent or a 
member of the decedent's family actively used the property.32 How­
ever, the qualified heir who owned the real property following the de­
cedent's death must have used it personally throughout a ten year 
period.33 
Furthermore, ERT A amended the material participation require­
ment of section 2032A(b). Prior to 1981, section 2032A(b) required 
that an individual must have materially participated in the operation 
of the qualified property for at least five of the eight years preceding 
the decedent's death.34 ERTA's amendment provided that a surviving 
spouse who inherited real property from a decedent spouse, whose es­
tate was valued at its current use value, may include the deceased 
spouse's material participation in order to meet the active manage­
ment requirement. 35 
ERT A provided other substantive changes. 36 One change in­
cluded enlarging the definition of property acquired by the qualified 
heir to include property purchased by the heir from the estate.37 The 
"member of the family" definition of I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(2) was 
amended for special use valuation purposes to include only an individ­
ual's ancestor, spouse, lineal descendant, lineal descendant of the indi­
31. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172. The Technical Corrections Act of 1982 made 
technical, clerical, conforming, and clarifying amendments to ERTA. See Technical Cor­
rections Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-448, 96 Stat. 2365 (1983). 
32. Prior to ERTA, only active use by the decedent would be considered a qualified 
use. See ERTA § 421(b)(1), 95 Stat. 172,306. 
33. ERTA reduced the "recapture period" from 15 years to 10 years. S. REP. No. 
144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 136, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 105, 
236. Thee Senate Report of the Economic Recovery Tax A'ct of 1981 originally discussed 
this "recapture period" as follows: 
If, within 15 years after the death of the decedent (and before the death of 
the qualified heir), the property is disposed of to non-family members or ceases to 
be used for farming or other closely held business purposes, all or a portion of the 
Federal estate tax benefits obtained by virtue of the reduced valuation are recap­
tured by means of a special "additional estate tax" imposed on the qualified heir. 
Id. at 132, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 105,232. 
34. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455,§ 2003, 90 Stat. 1520, 1857. 
35. ERTA § 421(b)(5)(A), 95 Stat. 172,306-07. 
36. Among other changes, ERTA amended I.R.C. § 2032A(2)(A) to increase the 
maximimum reduction in fair market value of qualified property. See ERTA § 421(a), 95 
Stat. 172, 306. Additionally, ERTA amended I.R.C. § 2032A(c)(7), granting qualified 
heirs a two-year grace period to begin the qualified use, after which time the recapture tax 
would be imposed. See ERTA § 421(c)(2)(A), 95 Stat. 172, 307. 
37. ERTA § 4210)(2),95 Stat. 172,312 (amending I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(9». 
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vidual's spouse, lineal descendant of the individual's parent, or the 
spouse of any lineal descendant.38 
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 added I.R.C. § 2032A(d)(3), which 
provided an estate with the opportunity to perfect a notice of special 
use valuation election where the estate tax return is in substantial com­
.pliance under state law, and included the signatures of all parties hav­
ing a present or remainder interest. 39 
Section 2032A has gone through a number of substantive changes 
since its original enactment in 1976. The amendments to section 
2032A reflect a trend toward increased liberalization of the availability 
of the section. In fact, ERTA's proposed changes were designed to 
expand the availability of current use valuation to estates not eligible 
under the prior law, to enable additional farm estates to take advan­
tage of a simplified valuation formula, and to reduce the post-death 
restrictions on qualified heirs who inherit specially valued real prop­
erty.40 Nevertheless, the statutory language remained unclear in the 
situation where a percentage of the interest in a farm passed to a non­
qualified heir. An examination of prior case law may therefore be 
helpful in resolving this dilemma. 
C. Precedent 
A review of the cases in which the courts have interpreted the 
qualified heir requirement reveals different outcomes with respect to 
eligibility for election of special use valuation. However, a recurring 
theme in the cases is the constant reference to Congress' purpose in 
enacting section 2032A. 
In Estate ofDavis v. Commissioner,41 the decedent devised a por­
tion of his estate to two trusts. The first trust went to the decedent's 
widow. The second trust, which contained farm property, went to his 
three children, one of whom was a child by a previous marriage.42 
The second trust was to terminate on the death of the last of the three 
children, with the corpus distributed to surviving descendants of the 
children or to three institutions, should the children die without 
38. Id. § 421(i), 95 Stat. 172, 312 (amending 1.R.c. § 2032A(e)(2)). 
39. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1025(a), 98 Stat. 494, 1030-31. 
40. S. REp. No. 144, supra note 33, at 133, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 105, 233; see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
41. 86 T.C. 1156 (1986). 
42. Id. 
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issue.43 
The estate utilized special use valuation for the farm property 
given to the second trust.44 However, the Internal Revenue Service 
("I.R.S.") assessed an estate tax deficiency since all the successive in­
terests were not "qualified heirs."4s 
The Tax Court rejected the 1.R.S.'s position, holding that the es­
tate did qualify for special use valuation.46 The court reasoned that it 
was extremely unlikely that the non-qualified class of contingent bene­
ficiaries would obtain the property.47 The court further indicated that 
if the 1.R.S.'s estate tax regulations48 were applied, the legislative pur­
pose behind the enactment of section 2032A "as a relief provision to 
permit continued farming or business operations by the decedent's 
family"49 could not be achieved. .The court concluded that the regula­
tion was invalid to the extent that it was inconsistent with the congres­
sional intent of preserving family farms and businesses. so 
Similarly, the Tax Court in Estate of Clinard v. Commissioner sl 
allowed election of special use valuation. In Estate ofClinard, the de­
cedent bequeathed a life interest in farmland to her two children, their 
spouses, and to her three grandchildren. 52 The grandchildren had a 
special power of appointment over their remainder interests. 53 Should 
the grandchildren not exercise their power of appointment and die 
without descendants, the property was to be distributed to the Univer­
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 1162. 
45. The I.R.S. disallowed the election because the ultimate remainder beneficiaries of 
the trust, i.e., the charitable institutions, did not fall within the qualified heir requirement of 
section 2032A(e)(l). Id. 
46. Id. at 1167-68. 
47. Id. at 1166-67. 
48. Id. at 1163 (quoting Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1963». The 
Internal Revenue Service's Estate Tax Regulation section 20.2032A-8(a)(2) provides: 
If successive interests (e.g. life estates and remainder interests) are created by a 
decedent in otherwise qualified property, an election under section 2032A is avail­
able only with respect to that property (or portion thereof) in which qualified 
heirs of the decedent receive all of the successive interests, and such an election 
must include the interests of all those heirs .... Where successive interests in 
specially valued property are created, remainder interests are treated as being re­
ceived by qualified heirs only if such remainder interests are not contingent upon 
surviving a nonfamily member or are not subject to divestment in favor of a non­
family member. 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032A-8(a)(2) (as amended in 1963). 
49. Estate of Davis, 86 T.e. at 1163. 
50. Id. at 1167-68. 
51. 86 T.e. 1180 (1986). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
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sity of Illinois, an "unqualified person" within the meaning of section 
2032A.54 The I.R.S. determined that the decedent's estate was not 
entitled to special use valuation under section 2032A since a possibility 
existed, however remote, that all of the successive interests might not 
pass to qualified heirs. 55 
The Tax Court, however, held that the special use valuation could 
be used as the decedent's interest in the farmland did pass to qualified 
heirs for the purpose of utilizing section 2032A.56 The court held that 
congressional concern for the effect of an estate tax upon family farms 
justified allowing special use valuation in this case. 57 Since the con­
gressional purpose in enacting section 2032A was to aid in the preser­
vation of family farms, the court believed that the remote possibility of 
an interest passing to an unqualified heir should not defeat the dece­
dent's dispositive scheme which, in all other respects, fits within the 
congressional intent. 58 The court further stated that a restrictive inter­
pretation of section 20.2032A-8(a)(2) of the Estate Tax Regulations59 
would be "fundamentally unfair."60 
In contrast, the courts of appeals in both Estate ofCowser v. Com­
missioner 61 and Whalen v. United States 62 denied special use valuation 
for failing to meet the qualified heir requirement. In Estate ofCowser, 
the decedent devised his farm to his deceased wife's grandniece and 
her husband.63 The grandniece, as executrix of the estate, attempted 
to elect special use valuation for estate tax purposes.64 The I.R.S. de­
termined that she was not a "qualified heir" within the meaning of 
section 2032A and thus imposed a federal estate tax deficiency.65 
The Tax Court upheld the I.R.S.'s decision.66 The court of 
appeals affirmed, indicating that "qualified heir" under section 
54. Id. at 1183. See supra note 20 for a definition of "qualified heir" under section 
2032A(b)(I)(A). 
55. Estate o/Clinard, 86 T.C. at 1181-82. The parties agreed that the requirements 
for special use valuation were met, with the exception of section 2032A(b)(I), which re­
quires that the property "was acquired from or passed from the decedent to a qualified heir 
of the decedent." Id. at 1184. 
56. Id. at 1189-90. 
57. Id. at 1185. 
58. Id. 
59. See supra note 48. 
60. Estate o/Clinard, 86 T.C. at 1189. 
61. 736 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1984). 
62. 826 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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2032A(e)(I) included only the lineal descendants of a decedent's 
grandparents, not the lineal descendants of a decedent's spouse's 
grandparents.67 Therefore, the court determined that the grandniece 
was not a "qualified heir" under the "plain language" of the statute. 
The court further stated that "[i]t is a common rule of statutory con­
struction that when the plain language of a statute is clear, courts need 
look no farther than those words in interpreting the statute."68 How­
ever, the court did indicate that where the words of a statute are at 
odds with the legislative policy, courts may look beyond the words to 
interpret the statute in a manner which is consistent with the intent of 
Congress.69 
The court noted that allowing the appellants to take advantage of 
the special use valuation provision might further the congressional 
goal of saving family farms. However, the court was not willing to 
conclude that adhering to the precise language of the statute was so 
"plainly at variance with congressional intent that we should presume 
Congress did not mean what it said when it defined 'qualified heir.' "70 
Similarly, the court of appeals denied election of special use valu­
ation in Whalen v. United States.7 1 In Whalen, the decedent devised 
farmland to her three sons and one stepdaughter.72 The estate elected 
special use valuation under section 2032A, and was allowed special 
use valuation for the 75% interest which was devised to qualified 
heirs. However, the estate was denied the special use valuation for the 
quarter interest devised to the stepdaughter, stating she was not a 
qualified heir within the meaning of section 2032A.73 The estate ar­
gued that section 2032A did not require property to pass to a qualified 
heir until the amendments were incorporated by the Revenue Act of 
1978.74 The court of appeals dismissed this argument, stating that the 
1978 amendment of section 2032A clarified a technical defect in the 
preexisting law, but did not alter the previous requirement that prop­
erty must pass to a member of the decedent's family in order for the 
recipient to be classified as a qualified heir.75 Therefore, since a step- . 
daughter did not qualify as a "member of the family" under section 
2032A, the court disallowed the special use valuation election on the 
67. Id. at 1172. 
68. Id. at 1171. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. 826 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 669. 
74. Id.; see supra note 29. 
75. Whalen, 826 F.2d at 669. 
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property interest devised to her.76 
While the courts' interpretation of the "qualified heir" require­
ment may initially appear inconsistent, the factual distinctions be­
tween the cases may explain the differences in outcomes. In Estate of 
Davis v. Commissioner77 and Estate of Clinard v. Commissioner,78 the 
immediate heirs were all qualified heirs. There existed only a remote 
possibility that the non-qualified successive interest would obtain the 
property. As such, the court allowed special use valuation in keeping 
with the congressional intent of preserving the family farm. In con­
trast, the concurrent interests in Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner 79 
and Whalen v. United States 80 were not all qualified heirs. Thus, a 
much greater possibility existed that the property would not stay 
within the family. The disallowance of special use valuation in those 
cases was nevertheless consistent with the congressional purpose, but 
simultaneously attempted to limit blatant disregard of the statutory 
language of section 2032A. 
II. ESTATE OF THOMPSON V. COMMISSIONER81 
In the recent case of Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner,82 the 
court was again faced with the problem of balancing congressional in­
tent with apparent statutory inadequacies. 
A. Factual Background 
Among other assets, the decedent Thompson, at the time of his 
death on May 8, 1982, owned four farms in Maryland.83 He devised 
these farms to a trust naming a daughter, Susan Taylor, as trustee.84 
The annual income of the trust was to be distributed in the following 
manner: 30% to each of the decedent's two daughters; the lesser of 
2% or $2000 to Marie Brittingham, an individual unrelated to the de­
cedent; and 2% to a trust advisory committee.8s The trustee was to 
hold in reserve the remaining net income, to be used for careful rein­
vestment into the operation. The trust was to remain in effect until the 
76. [d. 
77. 86 T.C. 1156 (1986). 
78. 86 T.C. 1180 (1986). 
79. 736 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1984). 
80. 826 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987). 
81. 864 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1989). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 1129. 
84. [d. at 1130. 
85. [d. 
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death of the last survivor among the daughters and Brittingham. At 
such time, the property was to be divided equally between the two 
daughters' estates.86 
The estate subsequently elected to utilize the special use valuation 
of I.R.C. § 2032A on two of the farms, reducing the fair market value 
from $1,027,007 to $327,307.87 On January 15, 1986, the I.R.S. re­
jected the election and issued a $509,957 notice of deficiency in 
payment.88 
B. 	 Decisions of the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals 
The Tax Court sustained the 1.R.S.'s determination of a defi­
ciency in federal estate taxes, in the amount of $500,267.89 The court 
ruled that for an interest in qualified real property to be eligible for 
special use valuation under I.R.C. § 2032A, all interests must pass to 
qualified heirs. The court concluded that the interest which passed to 
Brittingham, a non-qualified heir, disqualified all of the property from 
special use valuation.90 
The primary issue on appeal was whether real property is eligible 
for special use valuation when all the interests devised do not pass to 
qualified heirs.91 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deter­
mined that an interest in real property was eligible for special use valu­
ation as long as the requirements of the statute were met, and the 
interest was subsequently passed to and held by qualified heirs, "re­
gardless if other minor interests in the property are passed to and held 
by non-qualified heirs."92 As such, the Thompson estate qualified for 
special use valuation on the 98% interest in the real property which 
passed to the decedent's daughters.93 
86. 	 Id. 
87. 	 Id. 
88. 	 Id. 
89. Id. The Tax Court altered the amount ofthe deficiency after determining the fair 
market value of the farms. See id. at 1130 n.l. 
90. 	 Id. at 1130. ' 
91. In its determination of the issue in the case, the court was concerned with both 
concurrent and successive interests in the real property passing to qualified heirs. Id. at 
1131. 
92. 	 Id. at 1134. 
93. Id. at 1135. The court also noted that qualified ,real property retains eligibility 
for election under special use valuation in situations where qualified heirs have the power to 
appoint their interest to non-qualified heirs. Id. at 1136. 
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e. Analysis by the Court ofAppeals 
In its analysis, the court initially examined the language of 1.R.e. 
§ 2032A(b)(1), which defines "qualified real property."94 The court 
stated that the statute imposed limitations on the transfer of qualified 
real property only to the extent that it comprises 50% of the adjusted 
value of the gross estate, that it is put to a qualified use, and that it 
passes to a qualified heir.9s A strict statutory construction could 
therefore result in the estate properly electing special use valuation on 
98% of the value of the property.96 
However, the court noted that, since the language of the statute 
did not expressly answer the question of concurrent interests in real 
property, a certain deference must be given to the I.R.S., as it is the 
agency charged with enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code.97 
Therefore, the court conducted a review of the legislative history in an 
attempt to find support for the I.R.S.'s position that "real property" as 
used in section 2032A means a 100% fee interest in the property.98 
The majority opinion indicated that the congressional intent in enact­
ing section 2032A clearly demonstrated a desire to preserve the family 
farm and small fa.mily-owned businesses, and that legislative intent 
should not be defeated by technical inadequacies.99 Thus, despite the 
deference given to the I.R.S., its statutory interpretation of section 
2032A was rejected as contrary to the overriding congressional 
intent. 100 
Similarly, the court rejected the 1.R.S.'s argument that allowing 
special use valuation in this case would result in "larger and larger 
interests in family operations being left outside the family and inevita­
bly result in the erosion of the family-owned nature of these businesses 
which Congress sought to protect."101 The court indicated that the 
1.R.S.'s concern was not a problem due to the "stringent" criteria that 
94. Id. at 1132. 
95. Id. 
96. [d. The proportional system of allocation was similarly used by the court of 
appeals in Whalen v. United States, 826 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 138-40 
and accompanying text. 
97. Estate of Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1132. 
98. [d. at 1132 n.4, 1133. 
99. Id. at 1134. 
100. Id. In its rejection of the I.R.S.'s position that all successive interests in real 
property must be with qualified heirs in order to be eligible for special use valuation, the 
court noted that Congress provided a recapture provision in the statute. Id. at 1135. 
Under section 2032A(c), an additional estate tax is imposed if, within ten years following 
the decedent's death, the qualified heir either disposes of any interest in the qualified real 
property, or ceases to use the property for a qualified use. See I.R.C. § 2032A(c) (1988). 
101. Estate of Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1135 n.9. 
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must be met prior to eligibility for special use valuation. 102 
Overall, the court did agree with the I.R.S.'s contention that a 
narrow statutory construction should be given when a statute grants 
relief from taxation.103 However, the court further pointed out that 
the tax relief offered under section 2032A is a means whereby Con­
gress may strike a balance between generating tax revenue and pre­
serving family farms and businesses. Since the I.R.S. tried to tip the 
scales to the benefit of enhancing revenue through "overly restrictive 
interpretations," the court indicated that its decision was an attempt 
to even the balance while still adhering to the statutory language and 
the legislative intent. 104 
The dissent in Estate of Thompson presented a different account 
of the congressional intent behind I.R.C. § 2032A. While agreeing 
that the overall purpose of special use valuation was to allow family 
farms to be preserved from one generation to the next, the dissent 
stated that the legislature did not intend for the protective provisions 
of section 2032A to extend to income interests bequeathed to non­
qualified heirs. !Os Since the statute carefully defined the categories of 
"qualified heirs"l06 and the character of "qualified real property,"107 
the dissent argued that Congress did not intend special use valuation 
to apply to situations where interests were proportionally devised to 
non-family members, as no specific language in the statute pertained to 
this situation. l08 By allowing special use valuation for property in 
which a non-qualified heir retains an income interest, the dissent indi­
cated that the congressional purpose of protecting family farms would 
be altered to a general tax preference for real property devised for agri­
cultural purposes. 109 
Furthermore, the dissent argued that provisions for proportional­
ity were discussed within the statute under the recapture tax and the 
qualified real property provision. 110 The dissent indicated that the 
existence of these provisions "makes more glaring the absence of any 
provision for proportional devises to non-qualifying heirs."lll The 
dissent supported this interpretation of section 2032A through legisla­
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1136. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 1137 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
106. See I.R.C. § 2032A(e)(I) (1988). 
107. See I.R.C. § 2032A(b) (1988). 
108. Estate of Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1137 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1137-38; see I.R.C. § 2032A(b), (c)(I) (1988). 
111. Estate of Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1138 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
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tive history, by indicating that the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984112 
relaxed the requirements for election of special use valuation, but spe­
cifically stated that all parties with an interest in the qualified property 
still must be qualified heirs. ll3 
In addition, the dissent expressed concern over the decision by 
the majority to allow special use valuation "regardless if other minor 
interests in the property are passed to and held by non-qualified 
heirs." 114 The dissent feared that without proper clarification of the 
term "minor interest," courts would be allowed to decide de minimis 
exception cases on the basis of their own view of equity, rather than on 
the basis of the statutory requirements. I IS 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. 	 Congressional Intent of Section 2032A as Interpreted by the 
Majority and the Dissent 
The majority and the dissent based their opinions primarily on 
the congressional intent behind section 2032A. While both opinions 
agreed that the primary purpose behind the enactment of section 
2032A is the preservation of family farms and businesses, their inter­
pretations of the extent to which this purpose may be achieved varied 
significantly. The majority favored a broader application of section 
2032A, in keeping with the overall goal of facilitating the transition of 
family farms and businesses from one generation to the next. The ma­
112. 	 Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494. 
113. 	 Id. The language on which the dissent relied is as follows: 
The conferees are aware that the current use valuation provision requires 
that, when successive interests or concurrent interests are created in specially val­
ued property, all parties with any interest in the property must be qualified heirs 
and all such parties must enter into the agreement to the election, regardless of 
the relative values of their interests. The de minimis rule established in this provi­
sion is intended to apply solely as a guideline in determining whether perfection 
of an agreement is to be permitted. The guideline is not intended to give rise to an 
inference that parties having an interest in specially valued property which has a 
relatively small value are not required to enter into the agreement or that such 
persons need not be qualified heirs. 
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 757, 1241 n.l, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1929 n.!. However, in the General Explanation of the 
Revenue Provisions of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, this language was modified to 
apply only to successive interests (not concurrent interests as found in Estate 0/ Thompson). 
See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANA­
TION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 1124 n.23 
(Comm. Print 1984). 
114. Estate 0/ Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1139 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (quoting the 
majority opinion). 
115. 	 Id. 
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jority indicated that the legislative history did not support an "overly­
restrictive interpretation of the statute."116 The support for this state­
ment came from the following remarks made by Senator Dixon when 
he introduced the 1984 amendment to I.R.C. § 2032A: 
The law and the report [the 1976 House Ways and Means 
Committee Report] both state the public policy issue directly and 
forcefully. Congress wants to continue the family farm and small 
family-owned enterprises. Congress does not want the death of the 
owner of a family farm or a small family-operated business to force 
the sale of that farm or business if the family wants to stay in farm­
ing or the small business. The idea was to not permit the Federal 
estate tax to destroy farms or small businesses. 
There seem to be people at the IRS, however, who are not in­
terested in preserving family farms and small businesses, and who 
want to use the slightest technicality to prevent an estate from being 
valued under the provisions of Section 2032A. 117 
Furthermore, the majority placed great emphasis upon achieving 
the overall goal behind the statute, despite any technical inadequacies 
that may exist in the requirements for election of special use valua­
tion. 1I8 In fact, the court stated that "[w]hen Congress clearly demon­
strates an intent to preserve an institution, such as the family farm and 
family owned businesses, a common sense approach should be applied, 
and the technical inadequacies of the statute should be subservient to 
the overriding Congressional intent."119 
In contrast, the dissent would apparently have preferred a stricter 
application of special use valuation, with no allowance for de minimis 
exceptions. As the field of estate planning and estate taxation "de­
pends upon clear and settled rules," the dissent feared that the major­
ity's approach of allowing minor statutory inadequacies would lead to 
further litigation and would violate the legislative intent set forth in 
the literal language of the rule. 120 In addition, the majority's conclu­
sion that the Thompson property "is eligible for the special use valua­
tion regardless if other minor interests in the property are passed to 
and held by non-qualified heirs" disturbed the dissent, as no definition 
was provided as to the meaning of "minor interests."121 
116. Id. at 1133. 
117. Id. (quoting 130 CONGo REC. S4318 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 1984)). 
118. Id. at 1134. 
119. Id. (quoting Estate of Davis V. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1156 (1986)). 
120. Id. at 1139 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. (quoting the majority opinion). 
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B. 	 Historical Trend in Favor ofAllowing Special Use Valuation 
Despite Potential Statutory Pitfalls 
The somewhat liberal statutory interpretation adopted by the ma­
jority in Estate of Thompson 122 appears to continue the trend of rely­
ing on congressional intent to uphold election of special use valuation. 
The Tax Court allowed special use valuation in both Estate ofDavis v. 
Commissioner 123 and Estate of Clinard v. Commissioner 124 despite 
what might be interpreted as "technical inadequacies" in the require­
ments of section 2032A. In these cases, a remote possibility existed 
that an interest in the estate might eventually pass to a non-qualified 
heir. A literal interpretation of the qualified real property requirement 
of section 2032A(b)(1) stating that property "was acquired from or 
passed from the decedent to a qualified heir of the decedent"125 would 
not have been met in either case. Nevertheless, the courts allowed the 
election of special use valuation and refused to apply a restrictive in­
terpretation of the statute which would violate the congressional 
intent. 126 
Moreover, an apparent distinction between concurrent and suc­
cessive interests was partially resolved by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals in Smoot v. United States. 127 In Smoot, a case decided after 
Estate of Thompson, the court held that the term "qualified heir" ap­
plied to qualified heirs with successive interests, regardless of whether 
they had powers of appointment which were capable of being exer­
cised in favor of persons who were not qualified heirs. 128 The decedent 
in Smoot devised real estate to her husband for life, with a power to 
appoint by will to anyone except himself, his estate, or his creditors. 129 
Should Mr. Smoot choose not to exercise the power, the remainder 
interest would be divided among the decedent's then surviving chil­
dren and the descendants of any deceased children. l3O If no descend­
ants of the deceased should survive Mr. Smoot, a one-half interest 
would be distributed among Mr. Smoot's heirs, and a one-half interest 
would be distributed to the decedent's heirs.l3l Therefore, the possi­
122. 	 See id. at 1128-36. 
123. 	 86 T.e. 1156 (1986); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
124. 	 86 T.C. 1180 (1986); see supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
125. 	 I.R.C. § 2032A(b)(I) (1988). 
126. 	 Estate of Clinard, 86 T.C. at 1187; Estate ofDavis, 86 T.C. at 1167. 
127. 	 892 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1989). 
128. 	 Id. at 605. 
129. 	 Id. at 598. 
130. 	 Id. at 598-99. 
131. 	 Id. at 599. 
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bility existed that Mr. Smoot could die within fifteen years l32 of his 
wife, having exercised his power of appointment in favor of persons 
who were not "qualified heirs."133 
The court in Smoot emphasized the importance of the congres­
sional purpose behind the enactment of section 2032A, and stated that 
"[t]he power of appointment creates only a possibility that a disquali­
fying transfer would happen, while denying the special use valuation 
creates the certainty of a heavy burden on the farm."134 In addition, 
the court noted that under the recapture provision of section 
2032A(c)(1), Congress embodied a "wait and see" approach toward 
the possible disqualification of the property by the qualified heir. 13S 
Thus, the court saw "no reason to assume that Congress intended to 
deny election of special use valuation outright to those estates subject 
to the possibility that an appointment power holder will make a trans­
fer to someone not a family member."136 
In Whalen v. United States, 137 the same court had determined 
two years earlier that a stepdaughter was not a qualified heir for spe­
cial use valuation purposes. However, instead of disallowing election 
of section 2032A on the entire estate, the court only denied special use 
valuation on the quarter interest devised to the stepdaughter. 138 By 
allowing special use valuation for the part of the estate which "quali­
fied" while disallowing special use valuation on the "non-qualified" 
portion, the Whalen court introduced an approach that had not previ­
ously been taken by the courtS. 139 
Although no specific explanation was given as to why this propor­
tional system of allocation was used, the court of appeals applied the 
statutory requirements of section 2032A, but in a less restrictive man­
ner than the all-or-nothing approach favored by the dissent in Estate 
of Thompson. 140 
132. See supra note 33 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "recapture 
period," which ERTA reduced from 15 years to 10 years. 
133. Smoot, 892 F.2d at 599. 
134. Id. at 601. 
135. Id. at 602. 
136. Id. 
137. 826 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1987). 
138. Id. at 669. 
139. Whalen may be distinguished from Estate o/Cowser, in which special use valua­
tion was completely denied, in that the entire estate in Estate 0/ Cowser was devised to a 
non-qualified heir. See Estate of Cowser v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1984). 
140. Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 1128, 1138 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
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C. Balancing the Concerns of the Majority and the Dissent 
The concerns expressed by the majority and dissenting opinions 
in Estate of Thompson must be reconciled in order to avoid further 
confrontations over the qualification for special use valuation when a 
minor interest is passed to a non-qualified heir. The all-or-nothing ap­
proach favored by the dissent would provide a "bright-line" rule, mak­
ing application of the doctrine straightforward. However, such a 
restrictive interpretation may accomplish exactly what the statute was 
designed to prevent, the destruction of the family farm. 
The broader application of section 2032A advanced by the major­
ity appears consistent with the policy favoring the preservation of the 
family farm. But, this approach of allowing non-qualified de minimis 
exceptions introduces further confusion as to when election of special 
use valuation is permitted. 
In an attempt to reconcile the problem, the term "minor interest" 
must be defined. Definitions from prior case law as to what constitutes 
a "minor interest" are limited, as such an exception was only utilized 
by the courts in Whalen v. United States 141 and Estate ofThompson .142 
While the court in Whalen allowed special use valuation despite a 
25% interest devised to a non-qualified heir,143 the dissent in Estate of 
Thompson was concerned that a 25% interest would be considered 
"minor."144 
Therefore, it appears that a smaller interest percentage passing to 
non-qualified heirs may be more appropriate. While the determination 
of any fixed percentage would be arbitrary, "nevertheless, the policies 
advanced by both the dissent and majority would be better served if a 
"reasonable" percentage were specified. An examination of I.R.C. 
sections which parallel section 2032A may provide some guidance in 
the determination of a "reasonable" number. 
While analogous sections are somewhat limited, I.R.C. § 2037145 
does provide some guidance. Similar to section 2032A, section 2037 
involves determining the value of a gross estate for estate tax purposes 
in property transfers taking effect at death. Under section 2037(a)(2), 
the value of the gross estate will include the value of the interest re­
tained by a decedent in transferred property if the decedent has re­
tained a reversionary interest in the property that exceeds 5% of the 
141. 826 F.2d 668. 
142. 864 F.2d 1128. 
143. Who/en, 826 F.2d at 670. 
144. Estate of Thompson, 864 F.2d at 1139 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
145. I.R.C. § 2037 (1988); see infra note 147. 
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value of such property. 146 
Both section 2037(a)(2) and section 2032A involve a possible 
avoidance of estate taxation under certain circumstances. In order to 
curtail abuse of such a tax advantage, the tax code incorporates certain 
requirements which must be met prior to eligibility under the sec­
tions. 147 Section 2037 utilizes a figure of 5% for the reversionary in­
terest which must be retained by a decedent in order to qualify for 
section 2037(a)(2). The similarities between section 2037(a)(2) and 
section 2032A suggest that a 5% figure might also be considered "rea­
sonable" in determining a "minor interest" for section 2032A 
. purposes. 
146. See Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-ta-Value Lines, 43 
TAX L. REV. 241, 264-81 (1988) for an overview of section 2037. See Estate of Allen v. 
United States, 558 F.2d 14 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Estate of Bogley v. United States, 514 F.2d 1027 
(Ct. Cl. 1975) for judicial interpretations and applications of section 2037. 
147. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text for the requirements of section 
2032A. Section 2037 reads as follows: 
(a) General Rule 
The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the 
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time after Septem­
ber 7, 1916, made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, if­
(1) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership of 
such interest, be obtained only by surviving the decedent, and 
(2) the decedent has retained a reversionary interest in the property . 
(but in the case of a transfer made before October 8, 1949, only if such rever­
sionary interest arose by the express terms of the instrument of transfer), and 
the·value of such reversionary interest immediately before the death of the 
decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value of such property. 
(b) Special Rules 
For purposes of this section, the term "reversionary interest" includes a pos­
sibility that property transferred by the decedent­
(1) may return to him or his estate, or 
(2) may be subject to a power of disposition by him, 
but such term does not include a possibility that the income alone from such 
property may return to him or become subject to a power of disposition by him. 
The value of a reversionary interest immediately before the death of the decedent 
shall be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual 
methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial princi­
ples, under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. In determining the value of a 
possibility that property may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, 
such possibility shall be valued as if it were a possibility that such property may 
return to the decedent or his estate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an interest so 
transferred shall not be included in the decedent's gross estate under this section 
if possession or enjoyment of the property could have been obtained by any bene­
ficiary during the decedent's life through the exercise of a general power of ap­
pointment (as defined in section 2041) which in fact was exercisable immediately 
before the decedent's death. 
I.R.C. § 2037 (1988). 
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Congress should resolve the confusion through an amendment to 
section 2032A which precisely defines what constitutes a "minor inter­
est." The proposed "minor interest" amendment could be added to 
section 2032A(e) which provides definitions and special rules for pur­
poses of utilizing section 2032A. 
A precise definition of what constitutes a minor interest would 
provide an objective measurement for determining the acceptable stat­
utory limits. In addition, such a definition would provide greater flexi­
bility and certainty in estate planning as estate planners could more 
easily elect special use valuation. Above all, the congressional purpose 
behind section 2032A of preserving family farms and businesses could 
be achieved while simultaneously adhering to the statutory language. 
CONCLUSION 
Through the enactment of I.R.C. § 2032A, family farms and 
businesses are able to value land at its current use, rather than its 
"highest and best use" value. 148 The estate tax savings resulting from 
this special use valuation was an attempt by the legislature to save 
family farms and businesses from the forced sales which were often 
required to pay estate taxes. 149 However, judicial interpretation of the 
requirements for special use valuation has not always achieved the ob­
jective set forth by Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in Estate of Thompson v. Commissioner attempted 
to broaden the application of special use valuation by allowing a minor 
interest to pass to a non-qualified heir, while still allowing election for 
the remaining 98% interest. ISO To alleviate the problems this de 
minimis exception may provide in future judicial interpretation of the 
special use valuation requirements, Congress should amend section 
2032A to provide a statutory definition of a "minor interest." Only 
through such legislative action will the congressional intent behind 
section 2032A and the sanctity of statutory construction be assured. 
Carol M. Currie 
148. See supra note 3. 
149. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
150. 864 F.2d 1128, 1136 (4th Cir. 1989). 

